Further Results on Asymmetric Authentication Schemes  by Johansson, Thomas
Information and Computation 151, 100133 (1999)
Further Results on Asymmetric Authentication
Schemes1
Thomas Johansson2
Department of Information Technology, Lund University,
P.O. Box 118, S-221 00 Lund, Sweden
This paper derives some further results on unconditionally secure
asymmetric authentication schemes. It starts by giving a general
framework for constructing A2-codes, identifying many known construc-
tions as special cases. Then a full treatment of A3-codes (A2-codes
protecting against arbiter’s attacks) is given, including bounds on the
parameters and optimal constructions. With these models as a basis, we
proceed by giving constructions of general asymmetric authentication
schemes, i.e., schemes protecting against specified arbitrary sets of par-
ticipants collaborating in order to cheat someone else. As a consequence,
we improve upon Chaum and Roijakkers interactive construction of
unconditionally secure digital signatures and present a (noninteractive)
construction in the form of a code. In addition, we also show a few bounds
for this general model, proving the optimality of some constructions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Gilbert et al. (1974) and Simmons (1984) conventional authentication codes
for two communicating parties were introduced. The authentication model intro-
duced by Simmons (1984) contains a transmitter and a receiver, who share a common
secret key. By usage of authentication codes, they can protect the transmission of
a piece of information against an adversary, who can either impersonate the trans-
mitter and insert a message on the channel, or replace a transmitted message with
another. The codes are unconditionally secure, meaning that the security of the
codes are not dependent on any complexity assumptions.
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Since the two parties share the same key they must be assumed trustworthy. This
is in many situations unnatural and Simmons (1990) therefore introduced extended
authentication codes, called authentication codes with arbitration, or simply
A2-codes. Here caution is taken both against deceptions from the outsider (oppo-
nent) and also against some forms of deception from the insiders (transmitter and
receiver). A fourth person, called the arbiter, is included. The arbiter is assumed to
be honest, does not take part in any communication activities, and his sole task is
to solve possible disputes between the transmitter and the receiver. In the A2-model
the transmitter and the receiver must trust the arbiter’s honesty. There are of course
several situations where this is a very natural assumption, but there are nevertheless
examples of the opposite, see (Simmons, 1990). This problem has been addressed,
and A2-codes providing protection against deceptions from the arbiter have been
proposed (Brickell and Stinson, 1988a; Desmedt and Yung, 1990). In the first part
of this paper, we consider authentication codes with arbitration and make a
generalization of the construction part. We improve upon previous results for the
case when the arbiter is not trusted, by giving constructions and tight bounds. The
main observation here is that no increased key or message size is necessary when
the arbiter may cheat. Instead, we can reduce the arbiter’s key and obtain the
desired protection.
A2-codes can be considered as a subclass of the more general concept asymmetric
authentication schemes. An asymmetric authentication scheme is a scheme where the
participants possess different keys which, in some way, are dependent. This
dependence makes secure communication possible and provides protection against
any specified attacks.
A main goal in this paper is to study the problem of constructing authentication
systems where the scenario is even worse than the A2-model with a cheating arbiter.
We consider systems where not only a single participant may cheat, but any
specified subset of the participants. We call attacks from several collaborating par-
ticipants collusion attacks. Already in the A2-model with a cheating arbiter, we can
think of a possible collusion attack if the receiver and the arbiter collaborate and
share their keys. It could be possible that they then determine the transmitter’s key,
or part of it and can cheat successfully. Work on such a scenario has been initiated
by Desmedt and Yung (1990). They introduced a broadcast model including a set
of receivers, where subsets of receivers could cheat on another receiver. This was
also described in Desmedt et al. (1992) and further studied in Kurosawa and
Obana (1997) and Safavi-Naini and Wang (1998). We consider a more general
(extended) model, where the transmitter is not assumed to be trusted, but is
allowed to collaborate with a set of receivers in order to cheat another receiver.
This will also open up the possibility of a dispute between the transmitter and a
receiver, i.e, the transmitter denying having sent a message that was actually sent
or a receiver claiming to have received a message that was actually never received.
This general model allows us to build authentication schemes that are very close to
usual (conditionally secure) digital signatures in the sense that the schemes can
protect against any collusion of cheating participants. An attempt to construct a
system with the above described requirements was done in (Chaum and Roijakkers,
1990), but this approach used an interaction between participants. They named
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their solution ‘‘unconditionally secure digital signature,’’ a terminology that we also
adopt. In our model, the solution is in the form of a code, meaning that there is
only one transmission from the transmitter to send a message and no interaction.
To develop the above model, we start by discussing some aspects of trust, protection,
and verification. We then define and construct several asymmetric authentication
schemes, especially ‘‘unconditionally secure digital signatures.’’ Such a scheme has
the same protection and verification properties as a usual digital signature. For
example, any subset of participants may collaborate in order to cheat. Protection
is provided against all these possible attempts to cheat, and additionally, each
participant is able to verify that a message is authentic. However, there are still
several fundamental differences between ‘‘unconditionally secure digital signatures’’
and usual digital signatures, one being the fact that in an unconditionally secure
solution each participant must hold his own secret key.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model for authen-
tication codes with arbitration and in Section 3 we then present a generalization of
the construction part of A2-codes. Section 4 treats the A3-model, i.e., the A2-model
for the case when the arbiter is not trusted, and provides both bounds and
constructions. In Section 5 we introduce general asymmetric authentication by
describing possible collusion attacks and giving the definitions for the different
attacks in this general model. In Section 6 we construct unconditionally secure digital
signatures both in projective space and using ideas from Section 3. Section 7 con-
tains some information-theoretical bounds, providing bounds on the key size. We
finally end with some conclusions.
2. AUTHENTICATION WITH ARBITRATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Since A2-codes can serve as a building block that illustrates many of the features
of unconditionally secure asymmetric authentication, it is suitable to start by giving
a general treatment of this subject. Previous work (Simmons, 1987, 1990; Johansson,
1994a; Desmedt and Yung, 1990; Bierbrauer, 1995; Kurosawa, 1994; Kurosawa
and Obana, 1995) have mainly considered more specific constructions, but in this
section we give a more general description of the construction part of A2-codes.
This will later allow us to transfer ideas to more general models of asymmetric
authentication. We refer to Simmons (1987, 1990) for a more thorough treatment
of the model that is used for A2-codes and a discussion that the different threats
that appear.
In the A2-model, the transmitter and the receiver are not mutually trustworthy,
and, hence, disputes between them may occur. In order to solve possible disputes
between the transmitter and the receiver, a fourth participant, called the arbiter, is
included. The arbiter has access to all key information and, by definition, does not
cheat. The arbiter is only present to solve possible disputes and does not take part
in any communication activities.
Codes for this model provide protection against deceptions both from an outsider
(opponent) and from the insiders (transmitter and receiver). Recall that we only
consider unconditional security, i.e., security against attacks performed with
unlimited computing power.
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As in conventional authentication, the transmitter wants to send some informa-
tion, called a source state, to the receiver in such a way that the receiver can both
recover the transmitted source state and verify that the transmitted message
originates from the legitimate transmitter. The source state s, taken from the set S
of possible source states, is encoded by the transmitter into a message m from the
larger set M of possible messages. The message m is subsequently transmitted over
the channel. The mapping from S to M is determined by the transmitter’s secret
encoding rule et , chosen from the set ET of possible encoding rules. We may assume
that the transmitter uses a mapping g : S_ET  M. The mapping g satisfies
g(s, et)= g(s$, et) O s=s$. (1)
In other words, the source state can be recovered uniquely from a transmitted
message. The mapping g is deterministic, i.e., a source state cannot be mapped into
several messages for a given encoding rule (splitting is not allowed). This restriction
is made for simplicity and most results that will be derived are also valid for
A2-codes that use splitting.
As usual, the opponent has access to the channel in the sense that he can either
impersonate the transmitter and send a message, or replace a transmitted message
with a different one. The receiver must decide whether a received message is valid
or not. For this purpose the receiver uses a mapping, determined by his own secret
encoding rule er , taken from the set ER of possible encoding rules, that determines
if the message is valid, and if so, also the source state. We may assume a mapping
h : M_ER  S _ [reject], where for all possible (et , er), i.e., P(et , er){0, we have
g(s, et)=m O h(m, er)=s. (2)
For the receiver to accept all legal messages from the transmitter and to translate
them to the correct source state, property (2) must hold for all possible pairs
(et , er). However, in general not all pairs (et , er) will be possible, i.e., have a
positive probability.
The arbiter is the supervisory person who has access to all information, including
et and er , but does not take part in any communication activities on the channel.
His only task is to resolve possible disputes between the transmitter and the
receiver whenever such occur. This is done in the following way. If the message m,
received by the receiver, could have been generated by the transmitter according to
his encoding rule et , then the arbiter decides that the message m was sent by the
transmitter, and otherwise not. The arbiter is assumed to be honest.
In the A2-model the following five types of cheating attacks are considered.
Attack I (Impersonation by the opponent). The opponent sends a message to
the receiver and succeeds if this message is accepted by the receiver as authentic.
Attack S (Substitution by the opponent). The opponent observes a message
that is transmitted and replaces this message with another. The opponent is success-
ful if this other message is accepted by the receiver as authentic.
Attack T (Impersonation by the transmitter). The transmitter sends a message
to the receiver and then denies having sent it. The transmitter succeeds if this
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message is accepted by the receiver as authentic, and if this message is not one of
the messages that the transmitter could have generated according to his encoding
rule.
Attack R0 (Impersonation by the receiver). The receiver claims to have
received a message from the transmitter. The receiver succeeds if this message could
have been generated by the transmitter according to his encoding rule.
Attack R1 (Substitution by the receiver). The receiver receives a message from
the transmitter, but claims to have received another message. The receiver succeeds
if this other message could have been generated by the transmitter according to his
encoding rule.
All parameters in the model except the actual choices of encoding rules are public
information. In all possible attempts to cheat it is understood that the cheating per-
son uses an optimal strategy when choosing a message, or equivalently, that the
cheating person chooses the message that maximizes his chances of success. For the
five possible types of deceptions, we denote the probability of success in each attack
by PI , PS , PT , PR0 , and PR1 , respectively. The formal definitions are
Definition 1.
PI =max
m
P(m valid), (3)
PS= max
m{m$
m, m$
P(m$ valid | m), (4)
PT= max
m  M(et)
m, et
P(m valid | et), (5)
PR0=max
m, er
P(m # M(et) | er), (6)
PR1= max
m{m$
m, m$, er
P(m$ # M(et) | m, er), P(m, er){0, (7)
where M(et) is the set of possible messages for the transmitter’s encoding rule et ,
i.e., M(et)=[m; f (s, et)=m, s # S].
We further introduce the following notations. Let ER(m) denote the set of the
receiver’s encoding rules for which m is a valid message, i.e., ER(m)=
[er ; g(m, er) # S]. Similarly, let ET (m) denote the set of transmitter’s encoding
rules for which m can be generated, ET (m)=[et ; f (s, et)=m, s # S]. Recall that
M(et) is the set of possible messages given encoding rule et , M(et)=
[m; f (s, et)=m, s # S]. Let M(er) be the set of possible messages for encoding rule
er , M(er)=[m; g(m, er) # S]. Finally, let ER(et) be the set of possible er ’s for a
given et , i.e., ER(et){[er ; g(m, er) # S, \m # M(et)], and let ET (er) be the set of
possible et ’s for a given er , i.e., ET (er)=[et ; f (s, et) # M(er), \s # S].
The support of a probability distribution P(X ), denoted supp P(X ), is the set of
values of X # X that have a positive probability, i.e., supp P(X )=[x # X; P(x){0].
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Note that we equivalently could have made the definitions using the support of the
concerned probability distributions, for example, ER(m)=[er # supp P(ER | M=m)].
Using the above notation it is possible to rewrite Definition 1 as
PI = max
m
|ER(m)|
|ER |
, (8)
PS= max
m{m$
m, m$
|ER(m) & ER(m$)|
|ER(m)|
, (9)
PT = max
m  M(et)
m, et
|ER(m) & ER(et)|
|ER(et)|
, (10)
PR0=max
m, er
|ET (m) & ET (er)|
|ET (er)|
, (11)
PR1= max
m{m$
m, m$, er
|ET (m) & ET (m$) & ET (er)|
|ET (m) & ET (er)|
, P(m, er){0, (12)
provided that we have Cartesian (no secrecy) A2-codes together with a uniform
distribution on the support of P(ER , ET) (see (Johansson, 1994b) for further
details). In the sequel, we assume that this is the case. It is then convenient to use
(8)(12) for calculating the different probabilities of success.
The overall probability of deception is denoted by PD and is defined to be the
maximum taken over all allowed attacks, in this case
PD=max(PI , PS , PT , PR0 , PR1). (13)
3. A2-CODES CONSTRUCTED FROM MODULES OF MAPPINGS
For future considerations, we start this section by reviewing a simple construc-
tion from Johansson (1994a) that uses the projective space of dimension 3,
PG(3, Fq), to construct A2-codes.
Construction 1. Fix a line L in PG(3, Fq). The points on L are regarded as
source states. The transmitter’s encoding rule is a line et not intersecting L. The
receiver’s encoding rule er is a point on the line et . When the transmitter is to map
a source state s into a message that is to be transmitted, this message will be the
unique plane m=(et , s) obtained by joining the line et and the point s on L
corresponding to the source state. The receiver accepts a message only if the point
er is contained in the received plane.
The messages are all the planes intersecting the line L in a point. Since er lies on
the line et , properly generated messages by the transmitter will always be accepted
by the receiver. The arbiter knows the pair (er , et). The parameters of the constructed
A2-code are
|S|=q+1, |M|=q3+q2, |ER|=q3+q2, |ET|=q4,
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and the probabilities of success for the different deceptions were in Johansson
(1994a) proved to be
PI=PS=PR0=PR1=
1
q
, PT=
1
q+1
.
Our aim is now to introduce a new approach to construct A2-codes using
modules of mappings. Let F=[ fi] be a set of functions fi : S  R, where R is a
commutative ring with unity. Furthermore, let F be a C-module, where C is a sub-
ring of R. Then we have the property c1 f i+c2 fj # F, where (c1 fi+c2 fj)(s)=
c1 fi+c2 fj for any c1 , c2 # C and any fi , fj # F, over CR. Let F$ be a set of func-
tions F$=[ f $i], f $i : S  R, such that F$F. We randomly choose f, f2 # F,
f1 # F$, and z # C in such a way that
f =f1+zf2 . (14)
The general construction of A2-codes that we propose is now given as follows.
Construction 2. The transmitter has as key et the pair ( f1 , f2) and the
receiver has as key er the pair ( f, z), chosen according to (14). To send the source
state s # S the transmitter generates the message
m=(s, f1(s), f2(s)).
The receiver receives m=(s, m2 , m3) and accepts m if and only if f (s)=m2+zm3 .
In a correct transmission, m2= f1(s), m3= f2(s), and thus f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s).
Let us introduce the notation
=0=max
s # S
a # R
|[ f # F; f (s)=a]|
|[ f # F]|
, (15)
=1= max
s{s$ # S
a, b # R
|[ f # F; f (s)=a, f (s$)=b]|
|[ f # F; f (s)=a]|
. (16)
Furthermore, let
=$0=max
s # S
a # R
|[ f $ # F$; f $(s)=a]|
|[ f # F$] |
, (17)
=$1= max
s{s$ # S
a, b # R
|[ f $ # F$; f $(s)=a, f $(s$)=b]|
|[ f $ # F$; f $(s)=a] |
, (18)
="=max
c{0
c # C
|[ z # C; zc=0] |
|C|
. (19)
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In the Appendix we prove the following.
Theorem 1. Construction 2 gives Cartesian A2-codes with parameters
|M|=|S| |R2|, |ER|=|F| |C|, |ET|=|F| |F$|,
and the probabilities of success in the different attacks are
PI==0 , PS==1 , PT==", PR0==$0 , PR1==$1 .
We continue with a number of examples, identifying some known constructions
of A2-codes as special cases of the above construction.
Example 1. Let F=F$=[ f; f (s)=as+b, \a, b # Fq], and R=C=Fq and
S=Fq . Then =0==$0==1==$1=="=1q (Johansson, 1994a).
Example 2. Let F=F$=[ f; f (s)=aqdsd+aq
d&1sd&1+ } } } +aqs1+as0+b,
\a, b # Fql], R=Fql, C=Fq , and S=Fq . Then =0==$0=1ql, =1==$1=1q l&d, and
="=1q (Johansson, 1995).
Example 3. Let F=[ f; f (s)=aksk+ak&1sk&1+ } } } +a0s0+b, \ak , ..., a1 , a0 ,
b # Fq], F$=[ f; f (s)=aksk+ak&1sk&1+ } } } +as0+b, \a, b # Fq], R=C=Fq and
S=Fq . Then =0==$0==1=="=1q and =$1=kq (Kurosawa, 1994).
We now give an example of a new construction obtained from Construction 2.
Example 4. Consider the case R=C=Fq . The family F of mappings forms a
vector space over Fq . Since each f # F maps S into Fq , each f # F can be written
as a vector of length |S| with entries in Fq and where each position in the vector
gives the value of f for a particular source state. Furthermore, there exists a set of
mappings in F, [ f1 , f2 ..., fk], that forms a basis. Hence, F can be represented by
\
f1
f2
b
fk+=\
f11
f21
b
fk1
f12
f22
b
fk2
} } }
} } }
. . .
} } }
f1 |S |
f2 |S|
b
fk |S|+ ,
where F then consists of all linear combinations of the rows. Clearly, an all zero
column would give =0=1 and if two columns are linearly dependent we will have
=1=1. Hence by writing down all linearly independent columns we obtain the
matrix
0 0 } } } 1
0 0 } } } :q&1
\
f1
f2
b
fk+=\ b b . . . b + ,0 1 } } } :q&1
1 :1 } } } :q&1
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where Fq=[0, :1 , :2 ..., :q&1]. The length of the rows, i.e., the cardinality of S, is
(qk&1)(q&1)=qk&1+qk&2+ } } } +q+1 and |F|=qk. It is now straightforward
to prove that for this family of mappings =0==1=1q (and ="==$0 ==$1 =1q). This
family shows a slightly better performance, i.e., larger cardinality of S for given
=0=1q and =1=1q, than previously proposed constructions.
A similar reasoning can be done for the case R=Fql and C=Fq , leading to a
maximal cardinality of S=(qlk&1)(q l&1) if =1<1. For this cardinality, we will
have =0=1ql and =1=1q.
4. A3-CODESA2-CODES PROTECTING AGAINST ARBITER’S ATTACKS
A disadvantage with A2-codes, as pointed out by Simmons, is the fact that the
transmitter and the receiver must trust the arbiter’s honesty. There are of course
several situations where this is a very natural assumption, but there are nevertheless
examples of the opposite (see Simmons, 1987). This problem has been addressed,
and constructions providing protection against deceptions from the arbiter have
been proposed (Brickell and Stinson, 1988a; Desmedt and Yung, 1990). The general
approach to solve the problem of an untrusted arbiter has been to add some extra
key bits that are shared among the participants (e.g. the transmitter and the
receiver share some key bits unknown to the arbiter (Desmedt and Yung, 1990)).
Also the message size has been increased and in (Taylor, 1994) it was even
erroneously claimed that this was necessary in order to obtain the desired protection3.
The purpose of this section is to show that the required protection can be
achieved without increasing either the key sizes or the message size. We give the
correct bounds on the message size and the key sizes for each participant and we
show the tightness of the bounds by giving optimal constructions. We start by
giving notation and the problem formulation. When the arbiter is not to be trusted,
we add two possible attacks:
Attack A0 (Impersonation by the arbiter). The arbiter sends a message to the
receiver and succeeds if the message is accepted by the receiver as authentic.
Attack A1 (Substitution by the arbiter). The arbiter observes a message that is
transmitted and replaces this message with another. The arbiter succeeds if the
receiver accepts this other message as authentic.
Denote the probability of success for each attack with PA0 and PA1 , respectively.
The formal definitions are
PA0=maxm, ea
P(m valid | ea), (20)
PA1= max
m{m$
m, m$, ea
P(m$ valid | ea , m), (21)
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3 This was corrected by the author at EuroCrypt ’94 Rump session, Perugia, Italy, May 1994.
where ea # EA denotes the arbiter’s key taken from the set of possible keys for the
arbiter. Let ER(ea) be the set of possible er ’s for a given ea # EA ; i.e., ER(ea)=
[er # ER ; P(er , ea){0]. As before, we can rewrite (20) and (21)
PA0=maxm, ea
|ER(m) & ER(ea)|
|ER(ea)|
, (22)
PA1= max
m{m$
m, m$, ea
|ER(m) & ER(m$) & ER(ea)|
|ER(m) & ER(ea)|
, (23)
using the same assumptions as in (8)(12). Even though the arbiter is not trusted,
he is still assumed to make honest decisions in case of a dispute. Assume also that
for a possible pair (et , ea), the arbiter with key ea always decides that m came from
the transmitter if the transmitter could have generated m according to his key et ,
i.e., if m # M(et). Then the bounds for usual A2-codes derived in Johansson (1994a)
are still valid. The overall probability of deception, PD , defined as the maximum of
the probabilities of success in all allowed attacks, is in this case taken over all seven
types of attacks. Authentication codes that take caution against all these seven
different ways to cheat are referred to as A3-codes.
4.1. Bounds on A3-Codes
In order to derive new bounds we examine the probabilities of success for the R0
and R1 attacks. Recall that in the R0 attack the receiver claims to have received a
message m that was never sent and succeeds if the arbiter decides that the transmit-
ter could have generated the message. We rewrite the definition of PR0 (Johansson,
1994a) as
PR0=maxm, er
:
ea
/(m, ea) P(ea | er), (24)
where /(m, ea)=1 if for the key ea the arbiter decides that m came from the trans-
mitter, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, in the R1 attack m is received but the receiver
claims that m$ was received. He succeeds if the arbiter decides that the transmitter
could have generated m$. The definition of PR1 can thus be written as
PR1= max
m{m$
m, m$, er
:
ea
/(m$, ea) P(ea | m, er), P(m, er){0. (25)
We then derive the following lower bounds on PR0 and PR1 , which are alternative
expressions for the lower bounds derived in Johansson (1994a).
Theorem 2. For any A3-code,
PR02
&I(M; EA | ER), PR12
&H(EA | M, ER). (26)
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs given in Johansson (1994a), based on
the proof of Simmons’ bound in Massey (1992) and can be found in the
Appendix. K
These lower bounds immediately give the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For any A3-code we have
|EA|(PR0 PR1)
&1.
Proof. Multiplying the two bounds from Theorem 2 together we get
PR0 PR12
&I(M; EA | ER)&H(EA | M, ER)=2&H(EA | ER)2&H(EA)|EA |
&1. K
Using Johansson (1994a, Theorem 6) we can summarize the lower bounds for
both A2-codes and A3-codes in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For any A2-code or A3-code we have
|ER|(PIPS PT)&1,
|ET |(PIPS PR0 PR1)
&1,
|EA|(PR0PR1)
&1
|M|(PIPR0)
&1 |S|.
In particular, if PD=1q, then |ER|q3, |ET|q4, |EA|q2, and |M|q2 |S|.
We also address the problem of multiple authentication, which means authen-
ticating a sequence of L random source states, s[1], s[2], ..., s[L], where s[l] # S,
l=1, ..., L. Every source state s[l] must be individually authenticated, so that it is
possible to verify the authenticity upon arrival. We assume that each transmission
takes place in a slot and thus L slots are used to transmit the sequence
m[1], m[2], ..., m[L], m[i] # M, 1iL (Smeets, 1994). The overall probability
of deception, PD , is in this case the maximal probability of success in an attack
taken over all slots i, 1iL. Considering A3-codes for multiple use, we can in a
way similar to Theorem 4 derive the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Any A2-code or A3-code for multiple use L times, with protection
PD=1q, satisfies
|ER|qL+2, |ET|q2L+2, |EA|qL+1,
and |M|q2|S| at each use.
Proof. This is an extension of the previously derived results and a proof is found
in the Appendix. K
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4.2. Constructions of A3-Codes
The bounds given previously are the same for both A2-codes and A3-codes. Thus,
if the bounds for A3-codes are tight, it should be possible to modify existing
constructions of A2-codes to get A3-codes without increasing the key size for the
participants. In this section we show how this can be done.
The previously proposed construction showing the best performance (Desmedt
and Yung, 1990) has for PD=1q parameters |S|=q, |M|=q4, |ET|=q6, |ER|=q5,
and |EA|=q5. Thus the construction does not meet the lower bounds on any of the
different participants keys, and more important, the message size does not meet the
lower bound |M|q2|S|. We improve upon these results by considering a con-
struction that meets all lower bounds in the previous subsection with equality. We
construct an A3-code with |S|=q and PD=1q. Let s # Fq and m=(m1 , m2 , m3),
where mi # Fq for i=1, 2, 3. Furthermore, let
et=(:1 , :2 , :3 , :4), (27)
er=(;1 , ;2 , ;3), (28)
ea=(:1 , :2), (29)
where :i , ; j # Fq for i=1, ..., 4; j=1, 2, 3. The A3-code is now constructed similarly
to the one given in Example 1.
Construction 3. The transmitter generates a message of the form
m=(s, :1+s:2 , :3+s:4). (30)
The receiver accepts all messages m=(m1 , m2 , m3) that have
m3=;1+m1;2+m2 ;3 .
In case of a dispute, the arbiter decides that the message m=(s, m2 , m3) came from
the transmitter if and only if m2=:1+s:2 . In the key initialization phase, the
encoding rules have been chosen such that
:3=;1+:1 ;3 , (31)
:4=;2+:2 ;3 . (32)
We must verify that the arbiter makes correct decisions, i.e., all messages sent by
the transmitter must be considered by the arbiter to have originated from the
transmitter. We see from (30) that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 6. Construction 3 gives Cartesian A3-codes with parameters
|S|=q, |M|=q3, |ET|=q4, |ER|=q3, |EA|=q2.
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The probabilities of success in the different attacks are
PI=PS=PT=PR0=PR1=PA0=PA1=1q.
Proof. We only have to consider the A0 and A1 attack, since the probabilities
of success in the other attacks will remain the same as in Example 1.
Attack A0 . The arbiter sends a message m and hopes for it to be accepted by
the receiver. Knowing only (:1 , :2), all er=(;1 , ;2 , ;3) occur with the same
probability. Thus, ER(ea)=ER and
PA0=maxm
|ER(m)|
|ER |
=max
m
|[er ; ;1+m1;2+m2 ;3=m3 ]|
|ER |
=
q2
q3
=1q.
Attack A1 . The arbiter observes the message m and replaces m with the
message m$, hoping for m$ to be accepted. Again, knowing only (:1 , :2), all
er=(;1 , ;2 , ;3) occur with the same probability. Thus,
PA1= max
m{m$
m, m$
|ER(m) & ER(m$)|
|ER(m)|
= max
m{m$
m, m$
|[er ; ;1+m1;2+m2;3=m3 , (m1&m$1 ) ;2+(m2&m$2 ) ;3=(m3&m$3 )] |
|[er ; ;1+m1;2+m2;3=m3 ]|
=
q
q2
=1q. K
Let an A3-code be defined to be perfect if its key and message sizes provide
equality in Theorem 4, and let an A3-code be defined to be equitably perfect if
additionally PI=PS=PR0=PR1=PT=PA0=PA1 . We then have the following
corollary.
Corollary 7. Construction 3 gives equitably perfect A3-codes.
An important property of asymmetric authentication schemes is how the key
setup can be done. The key initialization phase in Construction 3 does not have the
same structure as in Desmedt and Yung (1990). However, the following interesting
property shows that no loss occurs.
Theorem 8. The key initialization in Construction 3 can be done using three
secret interactions without changing the probabilities of success.
Proof. Let the key initialization be as follows. The arbiter distributes
(e$1 , e$2 , e$3 , e$4) to the transmitter and ( f $1 , f $2 , f $3 ) to the receiver, according to (31)
and (32). In a third interaction, the transmitter and the receiver interchange three
random variables (r1 , r2 , r3) from Fq . The transmitter’s key will now be et=
(e1 , e2 , e3 , e4)=(e$1 , e$2 , e$3 +r1+e$1r3 , e$4+r2+e$2 r3). The receiver calculates the
key er=( f1 , f2 , f3)=( f $1 +r1 , f $2 +r2 , f $3 +r3). We can verify that (31) and (32)
hold. Also, the arbiter knows (e1 , e2)=(e$1 , e$2 ) which will be his key ea . But he has
no knowledge about ( f1 , f2 , f3), since the random values were added. Checking the
probabilities of success in the A0 and A1 attacks, we will find them unchanged. K
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Remark. In the A1 attack we did not assume that the substitution attack must
include a change of the source state as in Desmedt and Yung (1990). If this assump-
tion is made, the three random variables interchanged in the third interaction can
be reduced to two random variables. Construction 3 can be modified in order to
obtain other parameters and we give the performance of two such modifications.
Theorem 9. There exist Cartesian A3-codes such that for PD=1q, they have
parameters
|S|=qn, |M|=qn+2, |ER|=qn+2, |ET|=q2n+2, |EA|=qn+1.
Alternatively, if we consider multiple use L times with PD=1q, there exist Cartesian
A3-codes with parameters |S|=qn and |M|=qn+2 at each use, and
|ER|=qn+L+1, |ET|=q2n+2L, |EA|=qn+L.
Proof. The first statement is a special case of the second statement. Let
s[l], m1[l], e2 , e4 , f2 # Fqn, m2[l], m3[l], e1[l], e3[l], f1[l], f3 # Fq , for l=1, ..., L.
Furthermore, let et=(e1[l], e2 , e3[l], e4), er=( f1[l], f2 , f3), ea=(e1[l], e2)
for l=1, ..., L. The A3-code is now constructed similarly to Johansson (1993,
Construction 2). In slot l, the transmitter generates the message m[l] as
m[l]=(s[l], e1[l]+[[se2]], e3[l]+[[se4]]).
In slot l, the receiver accepts all messages m[l]=(m1[l], m2[l], m3[l]) that have
m3[l]= f1[l]+[[m1[l] f2]]+m2[l] f3 .
Here [[x]] may be any linear mapping Fqn  Fq .
In case of a dispute, the arbiter decides that the message m[l]=(s[l], m2[l],
m3[l]) came from the transmitter if and only if m2[l]=e1[l]+[[s le2]]. In the key
initialization phase, the encoding rules have been chosen such that e3[l]= f1[l]+
e1[l] f3[l], for l=1, ..., L, and e4= f2+e2 f3 . We next calculate the probabilities of
success for the different attacks. This step is omitted, but performing these calcula-
tions will result in a probability of success of 1q in all allowed attacks, and thus
PD=1q.
5. COLLUSION ATTACKS AND BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
We will now consider a generalization of our authentication model to contain a
set of nontrusting participants, where deceptions may occur from any specified sub-
set of the participants. Attacks from a set of collaborating participants are referred
to as collusion attacks.
To further motivate these systems, we will first mention an example described in
Simmons (1992b). This example, which has been studied by Simmons at Sandia
National Laboratories (Simmons, 1992b), concerns verification of a treaty between
two parties. The problem addressed is how to verify that a treaty between the
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United States and the former Soviet Union to stop all tests of nuclear weapons is
fulfilled. The idea is to let the Soviet Union have a monitoring station inside the
United States and vice versa. The stations should be able to detect underground
motions resulting from underground detonations and then send the measured data
back home. The messages from these stations must be trustworthy, and a country
must additionally be able to prove to a trusted third party that the measured data
has not been tampered with. Since the measured data is already known, there
should be no secrecy. Thus authentication between nontrusting parties and with no
secrecy is suggested. One of the main features of this problem is that it cannot be
solved by any solution that includes complexity assumptions. It is clear that no
country would rely on the fact that the other country cannot factor a 200-digit
number or something similar. The only way the countries will agree on a solution
is if its security can be formally proved. Hence, we require an unconditionally secure
solution, and neither digital signatures or other topics from public-key crypto-
graphy, nor symmetric cryptographic algorithms like DES can be used.
In case of a situation where a violation against the treaty is detected, each nation
wants to prove its innocence. Therefore, such a system will need an authority that
is able to make a correct judgment, i.e., an arbiter with access to enough key infor-
mation to solve possible disputes. This could for example be a neutral nation, the
United Nations, etc. Unfortunately, there is no arbiter who is unconditionally
trusted by both parties. Thus, new threats from the arbiter are added to the
previous threats, and protection against a cheating arbiter must be provided.
It is, moreover, obvious that if only one neutral nation has the power of being
the arbiter, he is a potential threat even if he cannot cheat on his own. He might
for example join forces with one party, and together they could succeed in cheating.
Hence a nation will agree to such a treaty only if they are totally convinced that
no such collusion is a threat to the security. The arbiter also has the possibility to
solve a dispute in a dishonest way, or simply to claim that he lost his key. We have
now identified some new problems that have to be solved in this scenario. How can
disputes be solved in an honest way and how do we protect against several participants
joining their forces in order to cheat.
A possible solution to these problems is to introduce several verifying third
parties (arbiters or receivers) and to construct the authentication codes in such a
way that they protect against all attacks from collaborating sets of participants. The
verifying participants can then together make a decision in case of a dispute.
A model taking caution against these problems will be considered in the sequel and
will be referred to as the broadcast authentication model.
Our approach is to introduce several receivers that can verify each message’s
authenticity, and a single arbiter that is fully trusted for solving disputes. Note that
this approach of using a fully trusted arbiter is taken for simplicity, i.e., so that the
probabilities of success in different attacks can be defined and calculated in a simple
manner. In reality, having a set of receivers, we may not use a specific arbiter but
can consider a decision made by the majority of the receivers as a correct decision.
A related approach is to have a single arbiter and introduce a secret sharing
scheme for the arbiter’s key. Several arbiters may share the key in a perfect secret
sharing scheme (Simmons, 1992c), resulting in the fact that no arbiter has any
114 THOMAS JOHANSSON
information about the key. But consider the following. In case of a dispute, a
dishonest arbiter may give a false piece of information to the secret sharing scheme.
Thus an incorrect key will be generated as the arbiter’s key, and there is no
possibility to solve the dispute. Hence the secret sharing scheme must be able to
protect against such threats (Tompa and Woll, 1988; Brickell and Stinson, 1988b).
The idea of broadcast authentication schemes, i.e., schemes supporting several
receivers, was first introduced by Desmedt and Yung (1990) (see also, Desmedt et
al., 1992). They considered a broadcast system with multiple receivers, where a set
of colluding receivers tries to cheat another receiver. Codes for such a model are
usually referred to as multireceiver authentication codes and have been further
investigated in Kurosawa and Obana (1997) and Safavi-Naini and Wang (1998).
We consider a more general (extended) model and include any possible attack
specified in the model. The main difference from (Desmedt and Yung, 1990) is that
we allow the existence of attacks from the transmitter colluding with some of the
receivers. This includes the possibility of a dispute occurring.
A broadcast authentication system contains many (4) participants. This will
introduce some new aspects concerning trust, protection, and verification. It is
important that one explicitly states the possible threats that exist. In a broadcast
authentication system, there will be many participants verifying a message. In our
general setting we specify which participants should be able to verify that a message
for a certain receiver is authentic. We can allow this set of verifying participants
to be different for different receivers. We now describe a very general model for
broadcast authentication.
The set of participants P consists of a transmitter T, a set of receivers R=[Ri],
an arbiter A, and possibly a set of other participants O=[Oi]. The transmitter T
will generate a message m, and it can be addressed to any Ri # R, or to some
specified subset of R. The address is contained in the source state s, and changing
it implies a substitution attack. We also specify: how disputes are to be solved;
which participants that may collude against another participant by giving a set of
collaboration sets C=[Cx] describing which collusions of cheating participants
exist against participant x; and verification sets Vx describing which participants
that should be able to verify messages to a certain receiver x.
We next describe the existing attacks. There are two classes of attacks. The first
class of attacks is some subset of participants trying to get a fraudulent message
accepted by some receiver, i.e., trying to cheat a receiver. We separate into two
cases, depending on whether the transmitter is included in the cheating subset or
not. We denote the probability of success as PI (C) for the impersonation and
PS(C) for the substitution attack, when the transmitter is not included in the cheat-
ing subset. If the transmitter is included, we denote the probability of success as
PT (C).
The second class of attacks is a subset collaborating, claiming to have received
a message that was never sent and, thus, trying to frame the transmitter. Here we
have both the impersonation case and the substitution case. We denote the prob-
ability of success as PR0(C) and PR1(C), respectively.
Recall that M(et) is the set of messages that the transmitter can generate when
he is in possession of the key et , and let e(L) be the set of keys for a subset L of
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participants. Furthermore, let eRi # ERi be receiver Ri ’s key. The definitions of the
probabilities of success in the different attacks are given as follows.
Definition 2.
PI (C)=max
Ri
max
T  L
L # CRi
max
e(L), m
P(m accepted by Ri | e(L)), (33)
PS(C)=max
Ri
max
T  L
L # CRi
max
m{m$
e(L), m, m$
P(m$ accepted by Ri | m, e(L)), (34)
PT (C)=max
Ri
max
T # L
L # CRi
max
m  M(et)
e(L), m
P(m accepted by Ri | e(L)), (35)
PR0(C)= maxL # CT
max
e(L), m
P(m # M(et) | e(L)), (36)
PR1(C)= maxL # CT
max
m{m$
e(L), m, m$
P(m$ # M(et) | m # M(et), e(L)). (37)
Observe that in the R0(C) and R1(C) types of deceptions, we assume that success
in an attack is equivalent to producing a message that the transmitter could have
generated. The correctness of this assumption depends on how disputes are solved.
We only consider the case when a fully trusted arbiter solves disputes by the rule
that a message m originates from the transmitter if and only if m # M(et).
Introducing Ex(e(L)) as the set of possible keys for participant x if the keys
e(L) for the set L of participants are given, i.e., Ex(e(L))=[ex ; ex #
supp P(Ex | E(L))] and Ex(m) defined by Ex(m)=[ex ; ex # supp P(Ex | M)], the
above definitions can be rewritten in the following form:
PI (C)=max
Ri
max
T  L
L # CRi
max
e(L), m
|ERi (m) & ERi (e(L))|
|ERi (e(L))|
, (38)
PS(C)=max
Ri
max
T  L
L # CRi
max
m{m$
e(L), m, m$
|ERi (m) & ERi (m$) & ERi (e(L))|
|ERi (m) & ERi (e(L))|
, (39)
PT (C)=max
Ri
max
T # L
L # CRi
max
m  M(et)
m, et
|ERi (m) & ERi (e(L))|
|ERi (e(L))|
, (40)
PR0(C)= maxL # CT
max
e(L), m
|ET (m) & ET (e(L))|
|ET (e(L))|
, (41)
PR1(C)= maxL # CT
max
m{m$
e(L), m, m$
|ET (m) & ET (m$) & ET (e(L))|
|ET (m) & ET (e(L))|
, P(m, e(L)){0. (42)
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It might be appropriate to further describe the differences between our model and
the model used by Desmedt and Yung (1990). They consider a broadcast model
where the collaboration sets Cx only may consist of receivers, i.e., Cx R. In other
words, they assume a trusted transmitter and, hence, do not consider the class of
attacks giving the probabilities PT(C), PR0(C), and PR1(C). Our model allow any
collusion, i.e., Cx P. In particular, we do not assume a trusted sender, but con-
sider collusions between the sender and some receivers possible. Hence we provide
protection against disputes between the transmitter and a receiver that might occur.
This general model allows us to build authentication schemes that are very close to
conditionally secure digital signatures. The techniques we use to construct such
schemes are similar to those used by Desmedt and Yung.
We define some important classes of broadcast authentication schemes.
Definition 3. Let the set of participants be P=[T, R1 , R2 , ..., Rn , A], for
some n, and such that
v An honest arbiter A makes decisions in case of a dispute;
v All attacks from any subset of at most k participants (excluding the arbiter)
exist against all participants, i.e., Cx=[BP"[x, A]; |B|k], \x # P.
v The verification sets are Vi=[R1 , R2 , ..., Rn , A], \i=1, ..., n.
We call a code giving protection in such a system an (k, n)-threshold uncondi-
tionally secure digital signature, or (k, n)-threshold USDS for short. If k=1, we call
it a single-attack broadcast authentication scheme and if k=n we simply call the
code an USDS.
This definition is inspired by the work of Chaum and Roijakkers (1990) who
introduced the notion of an unconditionally secure digital signature. Their
approach was to construct an unconditionally secure solution through an interac-
tion between the participants. Our solution will be in the form of a code, meaning
that there is no interaction but merely one broadcast transmission of a codeword
from the transmitter to all the participants.
Observe further that we add an arbiter for simplicity only. In practice, we would
for example have the majority of the receivers resolve the dispute. But assuming an
honest arbiter simplifies the analysis of how a possible dispute is settled and hence
the calculus of the probabilities of success in the different attacks.
Let us end this section by a comparison between a usual conditionally secure
digital signature (Mitchell et al., 1992) and the codes in our model. Besides the fact
that only the sender can sign valid messages, two important properties of digital
signatures are the following:
v Any subset of participants trying to cheat succeeds only with a small
probability.
v The authenticity of a message can be verified by all participants.
These are properties that we also find in our codes. We should also note the dif-
ferences from a usual digital signature. In our codes each participant must have his
own secret key. Together with a large message size, this is in some sense the price
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we have to pay for having unconditional security. Also, for multiple use we must
refresh a part of each participant’s key for each transmission. On the positive side,
we will see that, besides the unconditional security, the constructions have a very
simple and fast implementation.
6. CONSTRUCTIONS OF UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE DIGITAL SIGNATURES
In order to construct different broadcast authentication schemes, we will take
two different approaches. In the first approach we will use a geometric language
and construct codes in projective space. In the second approach we will generalize
the proposed ideas in Section 3 in order to get a solution that is as general as
possible.
Examining Construction from Section 3 we only have to make a small modification
in order to obtain a single-attack broadcast authentication scheme.
Construction 4. Fix a line L in PG(3, Fq), q>n, where the points on L are
source states. The transmitter’s key is a line et not intersecting L. Each receiver has
a key eRi which is a point on the line et , and all eRi are different points.
The transmitter generates the message as the plane m=(et , s). A receiver Ri
accepts a message only if the point eRi is contained in the received plane.
Let us give the parameters of this construction.
Theorem 10. Construction 4 gives a Cartesian single-attack broadcast authen-
tication scheme with parameters
|S|=q+1, |M|=q3+q2, |ERi|=q
3+q2, |ET|=q4.
The probabilities of success in the different attacks are
PI=PS=PR0=PR1=PA0=PA1=
1
q
, PT=
1
q+1
.
The proof is a special case of the the proof of Theorem 11. We previously
mentioned two disadvantages with an USDS compared to a usual digital signature,
the fact that each participant must have his own secret key, and the long message
size. The last disadvantage can be partly removed, if we restrict the number of
participants in any collusion attack to a certain maximum value. We can construct
an (k, n)-threshold USDS as follows.
Construction 5. Fix a line L in PG(k+1, Fq), where the points on L are
regarded as source states. The transmitter’s key is a k-flat et not intersecting L.
Each receiver has a key eRi , which is a point on the k-flat et . All these points are
chosen such that the union of any k+1 points is a k-flat.
The transmitter generates the message m as the (k+1)-flat m=(et , s) .
A receiver Ri accepts a message m only if the point eRi is contained in the received
(k+1)-flat m.
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The parameters of the construction are given by the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Construction 5 gives a Cartesian (k, n)-threshold USDS with
parameters
|S|=q+1, |M|=qk+2+qk+1, |ERi|=q
k+2+qk+1+ } } } +q2, |ET|=q2k+2.
and protection
PI (C)=PS(C)=PR0(C)=PR1(C)=1q, PT (C)=1(q+1).
An important requirement of the construction is that n points should be placed
on a k-flat in such a way that any k+1 points span the k-flat. This requirement
implies a restriction on the pair (k, n) for the construction. In order to examine this
restriction, we give some known results.
We are interested in a set Q of n points in PG(k, Fq), such that the union of any
k+1 points in Q is a k-flat. We review some concepts from Hirschfeld and Thas
(1991). A set Q with the above mentioned property is called a k-arc. In PG(3, Fq),
the maximal number of points on a 3-arc is q+1 for q>3. In the general case
PG(k, Fq), the maximum number of points in a k-arc is not completely known, but
it has been shown to be q+1 for many cases. However, it is known that the
maximum number of points in a k-arc is at least q+1 (see also Goppa, 1988).
Furthermore, the problem of finding the maximal number of points in a k-arc in
PG(k, Fq) is equivalent to the problem of finding the maximum length of an
MDS-code over Fq with minimum distance k+2 (MacWilliams and Sloane, 1977;
Goppa 1988).
In our constructions, we will usually demand the probability of deception to be
small. Thus the restriction nq+1 has no strong practical relevance. As an
alternative, we can modify the construction and choose the set of points for the par-
ticipants, excluding the transmitter, independent and uniformly distributed. This
will slightly increase the probability of deception, but it may give advantages. It
removes the above restriction and it might simplify the implementation and the key
setup.
We next construct USDS using our second approach. Recall the notation from
Section 3 and let C=R and F=F$. Starting with an example, consider
(k, n)=(2, 4). The construction is as follows. Choose functions f (1), f (2), f (3), f (4),
f1 , f2 , f3 # F and z (1)i , z
(2)
i , z
(3)
i , z
(4)
i # R, i=2, 3, in such a way that
f1
\
1
1
1
1
z (1)2
z (2)2
z (3)2
z (4)2
z (1)3
z (2)3
z (3)3
z (4)3 + \f2+=\
f (1)
f (2)
f (3)
f (4)+ , (43)f3
where the matrix has rank 3. The transmitter’s key is et=( f1 , f2 , f3) and receiver
Ri has key eRi=( f
(i), z (i)2 , z
(i)
3 ), etc. The transmitter sends the message m=(s, f1(s),
f2(s), f3(s)) and Ri checks that
f1(s)+z (i)2 f2(s)+z
(i)
3 f3(s)= f
(i)(s), (44)
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and similarly for the other receivers. Let us consider the different attacks in an
informal manner. In the PI (C) and PS(C) attacks, a set of at most two receivers,
say R2 and R3 , tries an attack against another receiver, say R1 , by trying to get a
message accepted by that receiver. Knowing two equations in f1 , f2 , f3 leaves them
with a one degree uncertainty on the above functions and, hence, on f, and they will
succeed only with probability =0 and =1 , respectively. In the PT (C) attack, a
message different from the one the transmitter can generate must be sent. The trans-
mitter may collude with one receiver, say R2 , but remains uncertain about the value
of z2 , z3 . This will give a probability of success of =". In the PR0(C) and PR1(C)
attacks, a set of at most two receivers tries an attack by claiming to have received
a message. Again, knowing two equations in f1 , f2 , f3 leaves them with an uncer-
tainty on the above functions, and they will succeed only with probability =1 . It is
now clear that any (k, n)-threshold USDS can be constructed in this manner.
Construction 6. Choose functions f (i), f j # F and z (i)j # R such that
\
1
1
1
z (1)2
z (2)2
z (n)2
} } }
} } }
b
} } }
z (1)k+1
z (2)k+1
z (n)k+1+\
f1
f2
b
fk+1+=\
f (1)
f (2)
b
f (n)+ , (45)
where any (k+1) rows of the matrix are linearly independent. The transmitter’s key
is et=( f1 , ..., fk+1) and receiver Ri has key eRi=( f
(i), z (i)2 , ..., z
(i)
k+1). The transmitter
sends the message m=(s, f1(s), ..., fk+1(s)) and receiver Ri checks that
f1(s)+z (i)2 f2(s)+ } } } +z
(i)
k+1 fk+1(s)= f
(i)(s) (46)
for authenticity of a received message.
Theorem 12. Construction 6 gives a Cartesian (k, n)-threshold USDS with
parameters
PI (C)==0 , PS(C)==1 , PR0(C)==0 , PR1(C)==1 , PT (C)==".
Proof. See appendix. K
The matrix in (45) can be obtained by picking random matrices until any k+1
rows are linearly independent. The theme of this construction is the same as the
previous one, but now the construction is for a general family F of mappings. An
example of performance is given by the following corollary.
Corollary 13. Let F=[ f (s); f (s)=as+b \a, b # Fq]. Then Construction 6
gives a Cartesian (k, n)-threshold USDS, where
PI (C)=PS(C)=PT (C)=PR0(C)=PR1(C)=1q.
Proof. Calculating =0 , =1 and =" for F gives the result. K
Finally, we end this section by giving an example with collusion sets that are not
of threshold type. Consider the following scenario. An authority (e.g., the stock
120 THOMAS JOHANSSON
market) is transmitting messages to clients (e.g., stockbrokers), who can be divided
into two groups (e.g., two companies buying and selling stocks). A client in a group
trusts the other group members quite well but clients in the other group are not
trusted at all. This situation is well suited to the assumption that a client faces a
collusion attack where any k clients in his own group together with all clients in the
other group may collude. Hence, we let Cx consist of all subsets of participants
including k participants from his own group, or k&1, together with the transmitter,
and all participants from the other group. Here is how a construction in projective
space would look.
Construction 7. Fix a line L in PG(2k+2, Fq), where the points on L are
regarded as source states. The transmitter’s key is a 2k-flat et not intersecting L. On
et two nonintersecting k-flats, call them N1 and N2 , are chosen. Each receiver of
group one has a key eRi , which is a point on the k-flat N1 , and each receiver of
group two has a key eRi , which is a point on the k-flat N2 .
The transmitter generates the message m as the (2k+1)-flat m=(et , s) .
A receiver Ri accepts a message m only if the point eRi is contained in the received
(2k+1)-flat m.
Without giving a proof we note that deriving the parameters of the construction
similar to what has been done before would give a probability of at most 1q of
success in any possible attack. There are of course numerous ways to generalize
these ideas, for example to m different groups, different trust levels in different
groups, and limiting the number of cheating groups (or groups of groups).
7. BOUNDS ON THE KEY SIZES FOR BROADCAST
AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
Finally, we derive some information-theoretical bounds for our broadcast model.
Let PRiI (L), P
Ri
S (L), P
Ri
T (L), PR0(L), and PR1(L) denote the probability of success
in an attack of type I, S, T, R0 , and R1 , respectively, when the attack is performed
by the set L. In the first three cases, the attack is directed against Ri . This means
that the definition of PI (C) can be expressed as
PI (C)= max
Ri , L # CRi
PRiI (L), (47)
and similar for the other attacks.
Theorem 14. The probabilities of success in the different attacks are lower
bounded by
&log PRiI (L)I(ERi ; ET | E(L))&I(ERi ; ET | M, E(L)),
&log PRiS (L)I(ERi ; ET | M, E(L)),
&log PRiT (L)H(ERi | E(L)),
&log PR0(L)I(M; ET | E(L)),
&log PR1(L)H(ET | M, E(L)).
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Proof. See Appendix.
By considering an (k, n)-threshold USDS and multiplying we get
&log PR1I (<) P
R1
S (<) P
R2
I ([R1]) P
R2
S ([R1]) } } } P
Rk
I ([R1 , R2 , ..., Rk&1])
_PRkS ([R1 , R2 , ..., Rk&1]) PR0([R1 , R2 , ..., Rk]) PR1([R1 , R2 , ..., Rk])
I(ER1 ; ET)+I(ER2 ; ET | ER1)+ } } } +I(ERk ; ET | E([R1 , R2 , ..., Rk&1)])
+H(ET | E([R1 , R2 , ..., Rk]))
=H(ET)&H(ET | ER1)+H(ET | ER1)&H(ET | E([R1 , R2]))+ } } }
+H(ET | E([R1 , ..., Rk&1]))&H(ET | E([R1 , ..., Rk]))
+H(ET | E([R1 , ..., Rk]))
=H(ET)log |ET |,
which immediately gives the following combinatorial bound.
Corollary 15. For any (k, n)-threshold USDS with PD1q we have
|ET|q2k+2.
Thus we see that the performance given by Theorem 11 is as good as it can be.
Furthermore, Corollary 15 also proves the optimality of the scheme proposed by
Desmedt and Yung (1990) in their model with a trusted transmitter.
Since it is possible to use n independent A2-codes in a broadcast model, one can
not get a better bound than |ERi|q
3 for each receiver’s key if PD1q. Observe,
however, that n independent A2-codes require a large message size (concatenating
n individual messages) and that the transmitter’s key in this case is huge.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered the extension of the authentication model to a case when protec-
tion against collusion attacks must be provided when several verifying participants
are introduced. We emphasized on defining some useful systems and then showed
how they could be constructed. We also provided some useful bounds to estimate
the performance of proposed constructions.
In many applications, there is no need for the property that the authenticity of
a message can be verified by everyone. It might be more interesting for the trans-
mitterreceiver pair that the authority with the power of making a judgment can
verify and make correct decisions, or that this power can be split on a few instances.
It might in some cases even be favorable if the number of verifiers is limited.
An interesting application of the proposed USDS is to consider multiple use and
create provably secure digital signatures by combining a pseudo-random number
generator with an USDS. Considering for simplicity the multiple use construction
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in the proof of Theorem 9, we need to generate dependent keys in the form e3[l]=
f [l]1+e1[l] f3 , for l=1, ..., L. The simplest way to do this would be to have three
independent pseudo-random number generators. The first two generates e1[l] and
e3[l] and the third generates f1[l]&c[l], where c[l] is the constant c[l]=
f1[l]&e3[l]+e1[l] f3 . By publishing all c[l] in public and giving the seeds of the
pseudo-random generator to the participants, respectively, we have a set of depend-
ent keys in the required form. This requires a trusted authority to distribute the
seeds, but it is possible to consider interactions in the key initialization as in
Theorem 8. Furthermore, these ideas are, of course, valid for USDS in general. The
main advantage is that the generation and verification of the authenticity of
messages can be done very fast. The keys valid for the next message to be
generatedverified requires the pseudo-random generator to calculate the next
number, but this value can be precomputed. Such considerations have practical
importance; see for example Even et al. (1996).
An interesting open problem would be to find a pseudo-random number
generator that can generate dependent keys directly, without requiring a public list
of L numbers (c[l]).
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Using (8) we have
PI= max
m=(s, m2 , m3)
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)=m2+zm3 ]|
|[ f # F, z # C] |
=max
s, m2
|[ f # F; f (s)=m2 ]|
|[ f # F]|
==0 .
Using (9) we have
PS= max
m$=(s$, m$2 , m$3)
m=(s, m2 , m3)
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)=m2+zm3 , f (s$)=m$2 +zm$3 ]|
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)=m2+zm3]|
= max
s, s$, m2 , m$2
|[ f # F; f (s)=m2 , f (s$)=m$2 ]|
|[ f # F; f (s)=m2]|
==1 .
Using (10) we have
PT= max
m  M(et)
m, et
|ER(m) & ER(et)|
|ER(et)|
=max
f1 , f2
max
m{(s, f1(s), f2(s))
m=(s, m2 , m3)
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)=m2+zm3 , f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]|
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]|
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PT = max
(c1 , c2){(0, 0)
f1 , f2 , s
m=(s, f1(s)+c1 , f2(s)+c2)
_ |[ f # F, z # C; f (s)= f1(s)+c1+z( f2(s)+c2),f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]| &
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]|
=max
f1 , f2
max
(c1 , c2){(0, 0)
|[ f # F, z # C; 0=c1+zc2 , f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)] |
|[ f # F, z # C; f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]|
=max
f1 , f2
max
(c1 , c2){(0, 0)
|[z # C; 0=c1+zc2 ]|
|C|
==".
Using (11) we have
PR0=maxm, er
|ET (m) & ET (er)|
|ET (er)|
,
= max
m=(s, m2 , m3)
f, z
|[ f1 # F, f2 # F$; m=(s, f1(s), f2(s)), f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]|
|[ f1 # F, f2 # F$; f (s)= f1(s)+zf2(s)]|
=max
m3 , s
|[ f2 # F$; m3= f2(s))]|
|[ f2 # F$]|
==$0 .
Using (12) we have
PR1= max
m{m$
m, m$, er
|ET (m) & ET (m$) & ET (er)|
|ET (m) & ET (er)|
, P(m, er){0,
= max
_ |[ f1 # F, f2 # F$; m=(s, f1(s), f2(s)), m$=(s$, f1(s$), f2(s$)),f =f1+zf2 &
|[ f1 # F, f2 # F$; m=(s, f1(s), f2(s)), f =f1+zf2]|f, z
m=(s, m2 , m3)
m$=(s$, m$2 , m$3)
m{m$
= max
m3 , m$3 , s{s$
|[ f2 # F$; m3= f2(s), m$3= f2(s$)]|
|[ f2 # F$; m3= f2(s)]|
==$1 .
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From (24) it is clear that
PR0 :
m, er
P(m, er) :
ea
/(m, ea) P(ea | er).
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Now (m, er , ea) is in the support of P(M, ER , EA) only if /(m, ea)=1, since if
/(m, ea)=0 then m is not a message that might be generated by the transmitter and
thus P(m, er , ea)=0. Thus, we can equivalently write
PR0 :
supp P(M, ER , EA)
P(m, er) P(ea | er)
P(m, er , ea)
P(m, er , ea)
,
where the summation is taken over the support of P(M, ER , EA). The last
inequality can now be expressed in terms of an expectation as
PR0E \P(m, er) P(ea | er)P(m, er , ea) + ,
where the expectation is taken over all possible tuples (m, er , ea). This is
equivalently written as
log PR0log E \P(m, er) P(ea | er)P(m, er , ea) + ,
and, using Jensen’s inequality (Cover and Thomas, 1991), we get
log PR0E \log P(m, er) P(ea | er)P(m, er , ea) + .
The final step consists of identifying that
E \log P(m, er) P(ea | er)P(m, er , ea) +=&H(M, ER)&H(EA | ER)+H(M, ER , EA)
=&I(M; EA | ER),
and, thus,
log PR0&I(M; EA | ER).
For the second bound, it follows from (25) that
PR1 :
P(m, er){0
m$, m, er
P(m, er) :
ea
/(m$, ea) P(ea | m, er).
Following the same line as above, we finally reach the expression
log PR1&I(M$, EA | M, ER)H(EA | M, ER).
Here M$ represents a valid message different from M, which exists if |S|2.
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APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 5
For attack X, let PX[l] denote the probability of success in the l th slot. The first
step in the proof is to derive the information-theoretical bounds:
log PI[l]&I(ER ; ET | M[l&1] M[l&2] } } } M[1])
+I(ER ; ET | M[l] M[l&1] } } } M[1]) (48)
log PS[l]&I(ER ; ET | M[l] M[l&1] } } } M[1]) (49)
log PT[l]&H(ER | M[l&1] M[l&2] } } } M[1], ET) (50)
log PR0[l]&I(M[l]; EA | M[l&1] M[l&2] } } } M[1], ER) (51)
log PR1[l]&H(EA | M[l] M[l&1] } } } M[1], ER) (52)
log PR0[l]&I(M[l]; ET | M[l&1] M[l&2] } } } M[1], ER) (53)
log PR1[l]&H(ET | M[l] M[l&1] } } } M[1], ER). (54)
We do not do the derivation here but refer to Johansson (1994a, Lemma 12), which
gives a simple way of verifying these expressions (see also the proof of Theorem 2
which is on the same line). In the cases (48) and (49), we get the expressions
log PI[l]&I(M[l]; ER | M[l&1] M[l&2] } } } M[1])
and
log PS[l]&H(ER | M[l] M[l&1] } } } M[1]),
respectively. Since the transmitter generates the message M[l], we have
P(M[l] | ET)=P(M[l] | ET , ER). Hence these expressions can be reformulated to
give (48) and (49). In (51)(54) two alternative expressions are given for PR0 and
PR1 . The latter follows from our assumption that all messages in M(et) are
considered by the arbiter to the origin from the transmitter.
The next step is to multiply the bounds together in different ways. First,
log(PI[1] PI[2] } } } PI[L] PS[L] PT[1])&I(ER ; ET)&H(ER | ET)=&H(ER).
Since PX[i]1q for 1iL, we get log |ER|H(ER)qL+2. For the next
bound, we multiply:
log(PI[1] } } } PI[L] PS[L] PR0[1] PR0[2] } } } PR0[L] PR1[L])
&I(ER ; ET)&H(ET | ER)
=H(ET).
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Since PX[i]1q we get log |ET|H(ET)q2L+2. Finally,
log(PR0[1] PR0[2] } } } PR0[L] PR1[L]) &H(EA | ER)&H(EA)
and log |EA|H(EA)qL+1.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 11
The set of messages is all the (k+1)-flats in PG(k+1, Fq) not containing L. The
number of such (k+1)-flats is
_k+3k+2&&_
k+1
k &=qk+2+qk+1,
where [ nm] denotes the Gaussian coefficient (Wan, 1993). The set ET is all k-flats
having empty intersection with L. The number of such k-flats is
_k+3k+1&&_
2
1&\_
k+2
k+1&&_
k+1
k&1&+=q2k+2.
Finally, the sets ERi are all the points not on L, and they have cardinality
|ERi |=q
k+2+qk+1+ } } } +q2.
Attack I(C). By symmetry we can choose any Ri and L of maximal size such
that (Ri , T )  L. Then e(L) is a (k&1)-flat. Thus,
PI (C)=max
e(L)
max
m
P(m accepted by R i | e(L)).
Now eRi _ e(L) is a k-flat, call it N. A message m is accepted as authentic by
receiver Ri if and only if N is contained in m. Moreover, we have a uniform
distribution on all possible N. Thus,
PI (C)=
|[k-flats on m containing the (k&1)-flat e(L) and not intersecting L]|
|[k-flats containing the (k&1)-flat e(L) and not intersecting L] |
.
The number of k-flats on the (k+1)-flat m containing the given (k&1)-flat e(L)
is [ 21]=q+1. Since m intersects L in a point s, there will be one k-flat intersecting
L. Thus the numerator is q. For the denominator, the number of k-flats containing
the given (k&1)-flat e(L) is [ 32]=q
2+q+1. Here we will have q+1 of these
k-flats intersecting L in a point. Thus the denominator is q2, and
PI (C)=
q
q2
=1q.
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Attack S(C). Here m$ & m is a k-flat not intersecting L. As for the impersonation
attack, we can express PS(C) as
PS(C)=
_ |[k-flats on m$ & m containing the (k&1)-flate(L) and not intersecting L]| &
|[k-flats on m containing the (k&1)-flat e(L) and not intersecting L]|
.
The number of k-flats on the k-flat m$ & m containing the given (k&1)-flat e(L) is,
of course, 1. We previously showed that the denominator is q. Thus,
PS(C)=
1
q
=1q.
Attack T(C). We can choose any Ri and L of maximal size such that Ri  L,
T # L. Now e(L"T ) is a (k&2)-flat, and et is a k-flat. To succeed in the attack,
the message m must be chosen such that et is not contained in m, i.e., et & m is a
(k&1)-flat. As before, the attack is successful if and only if the (k&1)-flat
e(L"T) _ eRi is contained in the message m. Then
PT (C)=
_ |[(k&1)& flats on the (k&1)& flat et & m containingthe (k&2)& flat e(L"T)] | &
|[(k&1)& flats on the k& flat et containing the (k&2)& flat e(L"T)]|
The numerator is 1 and the denominator is [ 21]=q+1. Thus,
PT (L)=1(q+1).
Attack R0(C). We can choose any L of maximal size k such that T  L. Now
e(L) is a (k&1)-flat. If the attack is performed with message m, success is obtained
if ea is contained in m. Equivalently, success is obtained if et is contained in m, since
e(L) _ ea=et . Thus
PR0(C)=
|[k& flats on m containing the (k&1)& flat e(L) and not intersecting L]|
|[k& flats containing the(k&1)& flat e(L) and not intersecting L]|
The number of k-flats on m containing the given (k&1)-flat e(L) is [ 21]=q+1.
One of these k-flats intersects L, and thus q remain. For the denominator, the
number of k-flats containing the given (k&1)-flat e(L) is [ 32]=q
2+q+1. Since
q+1 of them intersect L, we have q2 for the denominator. Thus,
PR0(C)=1q.
Attack R1(C). We choose any L of maximal size k such that T  L. If message
m was sent, then message m$ is claimed to have been received. Success is obtained
if ea is contained in m$, or equivalently, if et is contained in m$. Thus,
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PR1(C)=
_ |[k-flats on m$ & m containing the (k&1)-flate(L) and not intersecting L]| &
|[k-flats on m containing the (k&1)-flat e(L) and not intersecting L]|
.
The number of k-flats on m$ & m containing the given (k&1)-flat e(L) is 1.
Previously, we saw that we had q as denominator. Thus,
PR1(C)=1q.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 12
We first introduce some short notation. Let Uk denote a set of k different
receivers [Ri1 , Ri2 , ..., Rik], and let K(Uk), l(Uk), and f be defined by
K(Uk)=\
1
1
1
z (i1)2
z (i2)2
z (ik)2
} } }
} } }
b
} } }
z (i1)k+1
z (i2)k+1
z (ik)k+1+ , l(Uk)=\
f (i1)
f (i2)
b
f (ik)+ , f =\
f1
f2
b
fk+1+ .
Also, the notation m=(s, m2 , ..., mk+2) and m$=(s$, m$2 , ..., m$k+2) is used.
Attack I(C). Using (38) we have
PI (C)=max
Ri
max
T  L
L # CRi
max
e(L), m
|ERi (m) & ERi (e(L))|
|ERi (e(L))|
=max
m
_ |[ f
(1) # F, z (1)2 , ..., z
(1)
k+1 # C;
m2+z (1)2 m3+ } } } +z
(1)
k+1mk+2= f
(1)(s), K(Uk) f =l(Uk)]|&
|[ f (1) # F, z (1)2 , z
(1)
3 , ..., z
(1)
k+1 # C; K(Uk) f =l(Uk)]|
.
Since K(Uk) together with (1, z (1)2 , z
(1)
3 , ..., z
(1)
k+1) is a nonsingular (k+1)_(k+1)
matrix f (1) can take any value for any possible (1, z(1)2 , z
(1)
3 , ..., z
(1)
k+1). Hence
PI (C)=max
s, m2
|[ f (1) # F; f (1)(s)=m2 ]|
|[ f (1) # F]|
==0 .
Attack S(C). Using (39) we have
PS(C)=max
Ri
max
T  L
L # CRi
max
m{m$
e(L), m, m$
|ERi (m) & ERi (m$) & ERi (e(L))|
|ERi (m) & ERi (e(L))|
_}{ f
(1) # F, z (1)2 , ..., z
(1)
k+1 # C;
m2+z (1)2 m3+ } } } +z
(1)
k+1mk+2= f
(1)(s),
m$2 +z (1)2 m$3 + } } } +z
(1)
k+1m$k+2= f
(1)(s$)
, K(Uk) f =l(Uk)=}&
=max
m, m$
_ |[ f
(1) # F, z (1)2 , ..., z
(1)
k+1 # C;
m2+z (1)2 m3+ } } } +z
(1)
k+1mk+2= f
(1)(s), K(Uk) f =l(Uk)]|&
.
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Again, since K(Uk), together with (1, z (1)2 , z
(1)
3 , ..., z
(1)
k+1), is a nonsingular (k+1)_
(k+1) matrix f (1) can take any value for any possible (1, z (1)2 , z
(1)
3 , ..., z
(1)
k+1), and
PS(C)= max
s, m2 , m$2
|[ f (1) # F; f (1)(s)=m2 , f (1)(s$)=m$2 ]|
|[ f (1) # F; f (1)(s)=m2]|
==1 .
Attack T(C). Let c=(c1 , c2 , ..., ck+1), ci # R, and |R|=q. Using (40) we have
PT (C)=max
Ri
max
T # L
L # CRi
max
m  M(et)
e(L), m
|ERi (m) & ERi (e(L))|
|ERi (e(L))|
f1(s)+c1+ } } } +z(1)k+1( fk+1(s)+ck+1)= f
(1)(s),
}{f (1) # F, z(1)2 , ..., z(1)k+1 # C; \ K(Uk&1)(1, z(1)2 , ..., z(1)k+1)+ nonsingular =}= max
f, K(Uk&1)
max
c{0
s, c
}{ f (1) # F, z(1)2 , ..., z(1)k+1 # C; \ K(Uk&1)(1, z(1)2 , ..., z(1)k+1+ nonsingular=}
Now (1, z12 , ..., z
1
k+1) can take q
k&qk&2 different values since qk&2 vectors of the
above form are linear combinations of rows in K(Uk&1). Hence PT (C) equals
max
c, c{0
K(Uk&1)
}{z (1)2 , z (1)3 , ..., z(1)k+1 # C; c1+ } } } +z(1)k+1ck+1=0, \ K(Uk&1)(1, z(1)2 , ..., z(1)k+1)+ nonsing.=}
}{z (1)2 , z (1)3 , ..., z (1)k+1 # C; \ K(Uk&1)(1, z (1)2 , ..., z (1)k+1)+ nonsing.=}
=
qk&1&qk&3
qk&qk&2
==".
Attack R0(C). Using (41) we have
PR0(C)= maxL # CT
max
e(L), m
|ET (m) & ET (e(L))|
|ET (e(L))|
=max
m
|[ f1 , f2 , ..., fk+1 # F; m=(s, f1(s), f2(s), ..., fk+1), K(Uk) f =l(Uk)]|
|[ f1 , f2 , ..., fk+1 # F; K(Uk) f =l(Uk)
=max
s, m2
|[ f1 # F; f1(s)=m2]|
|F|
==0 .
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Attack R1(C). Using (42) we have
PR1(C)= max
L # CT
max
e(L), m, m$
|ET (m) & ET (m$) & ET (e(L))|
|ET (m) & ET (e(L))|
=max
m, m$
}{ f1 , f2 , ..., fk+1 # F; m=(s, f1(s), f2(s), ..., fk+1(s)),m$=(s$, f1(s$), f2(s$), ..., fk+1(s$)) , K(Uk) f =l(Uk)=}
|[ f1 , f2 , ..., fk+1 # F; m=(s, f1(s), f2(s), ..., fk+1), K(Uk) f =l(Uk)] |
= max
s, m2 , m$2
|[ f1 # F; f1(s)=m2 , f1(s$)=m$2]|
|[ f1 # F; f1(s)=m2]|
==1 .
APPENDIX F: PROOF OF THEOREM 14
Again, the derivation of these information-theoretical bounds are very similar to
the previous ones found in Theorem 2, Theorem 5, and Johansson (1994a,
Lemma 12). We show a derivation for PI (C) and leave the other cases for the
reader. By definition
PRiI (L)= max
e(L), m
P(m accepted by Ri | e(L)),
 :
e(L), m
P(m, e(L)) :
eRi
/(m, eRi) P(eRi | e(L)),
where /(m, eRi)=1 if message m is accepted by Ri under key eRi . Any (m, eRi , e(L))
in the support of P(M, ERi , E(L)) has /(m, eRi)=1, since then m is a message that
might be generated by the transmitter. Thus, we can equivalently write
PRiI (L) :
supp P(M, ERi , E(L))
P(m, e(L)) P(eRi | e(L))
P(m, eRi , e(L))
P(m, eRi , e(L))
,
where the summation is taken over the support of P(M, ERi , E(L)). In terms of an
expectation the last inequality is expressed as
PRiI (L)E \
P(m, e(L)) P(eRi | e(L))
P(m, eRi , e(L)) + ,
where the expectation is taken over all possible tuples (m, eRi , e(L)). This is
equivalently written as
log PRiI (L)log E \
P(m, e(L)) P(eRi | e(L))
P(m, eRi , e(L)) + ,
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and, using Jensen’s inequality (Cover and Thomas, 1991), we get
log PRiI (L)E \log
P(m, e(L)) P(eRi | e(L))
P(m, eRi , e(L)) + .
The final step consists of identifying that
E \log
P(m, e(L)) P(eRi | e(L))
P(m, eRi , e(L)) += &H(M, E(L))&H(ERi | E(L))
+H(M, ERi , E(L))
= &I(M; ERi | E(L)),
and, thus,
log PR0&I(M; ERi | E(L)).
Next, note the fact that P(eRi | et)=P(eRi | m, et). As a consequence,
I(M; ERi | E(L))=I(ET ; ERi | E(L))&I(ET ; ERi | M, E(L)).
This proves the bound for PRiI (L). The other bounds are proved similarly.
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